Designation Date: 23 July 2026
Issuing Authority: Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), U.S. Department of the Treasury
Legal Basis: Executive Order 13224, as amended (counterterrorism sanctions authority)
Overview
On 23 July 2026, OFAC designated three individuals who ran a Türkiye-based money operation moving funds for Hamas: Khaldun Khamis Zakaria Alden, and two shareholders in the same operation, Zaid Issam Ahmed Al-Jebouri and Abdulla Issam Ahmad Al-Jebouri. All three were designated pursuant to E.O. 13224.
The detail that puts this on-chain is Zaid Al-Jebouri's SDN entry, which lists seven TRON wallet addresses as identifiers. The obligation to screen against those addresses took effect the moment they were published to the SDN List. Alden and Abdulla Al-Jebouri were named without published wallet identifiers, so their exposure has to be caught at the entity and counterparty level rather than by address matching.
This designation sits inside a wider action against the Muslim Brotherhood's financial support for Hamas, which OFAC describes as an offshoot of the Brotherhood. The centrepiece of the 23 July action is a UK-based senior Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood official, and it builds on Brotherhood-Hamas financing designations announced in January and March 2026. The three named here are the money-movement layer of that structure: the point where value destined for Hamas's military wing was settled, including on-chain.
The same layer did not serve Hamas alone. According to OFAC, El-Kahira for General Trading, the operation Alden owns and the Al-Jebouris hold shares in, provided underground banking in both fiat and cryptocurrencies to a Sweden-based organised crime group, the Foxtrot Network, and Zaid and Abdulla separately ran underground banking for a further criminal group. A settlement operation built to move money for Hamas was, on the same infrastructure, available to organised crime. That overlap is a reason the exposure runs wider than the seven wallets suggest.
Founder of NOMINIS Snir Levi shared ‘You cannot cut off the Muslim Brotherhood's support for Hamas without following the money the whole way down. This action lays out the chain: charities collecting under a civilian banner, then money operations settling those funds on TRON and moving them toward Gaza. The charitable label is the disguise, the stablecoin rail is the mechanism. At NOMINIS we see this pattern hold across case after case. Seven wallets reached the SDN List, but the network is larger than seven wallets, and the parts that go unnamed are exactly where the money keeps moving’.
Wallets belonging to Zaid Issam Ahmed Al-Jebouri had been on NOMINIS' for a while now. As early as August 2024, the wallet beginning TLoG... had been flagged by the NOMINIS platform and assigned a critical risk score. This is almost 2 years before its designation and addition to the SDN list.
About the Three Named and the TRON Rail
The Muslim Brotherhood-Hamas financing typology OFAC has been targeting through 2026 runs on charitable fronts, affiliated facilitators, and money-movement channels that carry funds to Hamas's military wing while disguising their origin. The 23 July action names a senior Brotherhood figure at the top of that structure and, lower down, the operation that actually settled the value. Alden and the two Al-Jebouris ran the settlement layer.
Zaid and Abdulla Al-Jebouri both hold Iraqi nationality, while Alden is Palestinian. All three operated out of Türkiye. Alden's SDN entry links him directly to Hamas; the two Al-Jebouris are linked to the money operation itself, designated for owning or controlling it.
The seven addresses attached to Zaid Al-Jebouri all sit on TRON, the settlement layer that has become the default rail for stablecoin movement in this class of case. That is consistent with what Brotherhood-Hamas financing channels have been doing for some time: TRON for low-cost, fast stablecoin settlement, held across multiple addresses rather than concentrated in one, so that no single wallet carries the full picture.
Observed behaviour across this class of network includes:
- Value raised through charitable fronts, then routed to the military wing
- Affiliated facilitators and money operations moving funds across jurisdictions
- The same underground banking made available to organised crime as well as Hamas
- TRON-based stablecoin settlement spread across a set of addresses rather than one
- Cross-border operation from jurisdictions that complicate enforcement
Crypto here is one settlement rail inside a wider financing structure, not a standalone channel.
Designated Identifiers
Zaid Issam Ahmed Al-Jebouri (Istanbul, Türkiye; DOB 3 October 1988; Iraqi nationality; Identification Number 99909088080 (Turkey); linked to the El-Kahira for General Trading operation) is listed with the following TRON (TRX) addresses:
- TPyE2oSoaysrXfLzwf9wetBVr9JudLwjtD
- TVgUsVzA7mpFExP4zS7HHbtKti6UuBDuwZ
- TLoG3vbjDgqmTD5bM7w9rMgA6ysaNReuRy
- TAhHpxPRwo1Bmm1A9m51uZ31tcB7EPq7SY
- TScXZTbDjjZ6a6jiC7dZjgCqfNo4vm7atV
- TGr2i8ZQiiMRjP3mWyQUH2MQBfKu8GJNqm
- THJUJFyTnrBWb1ijWav7qfRBrjUuKgP49Z
The other two individuals were listed without wallet identifiers:
- Khaldun Khamis Zakaria Alden : Türkiye; DOB 19 July 1980; Palestinian nationality; National ID No. 905337655 (Palestinian); linked to Hamas
- Abdulla Issam Ahmad Al-Jebouri : Türkiye; DOB 3 October 1988; Iraqi nationality; Passport B22037179 (Iraq), expires 11 December 2031; linked to the El-Kahira operation
The names are worth pausing on, because they make the compliance case on their own. Within a day of the designation, three transliterations of the same three people were already in circulation. The Treasury press release wrote "Khuldun Khamis Zakaria Alden" and "Abdullah Issam Ahmad Al-Jebouri"; the SDN List itself uses "Khaldun" and "Abdulla"; regional coverage rendered them "Khaldoun Khamees Zakaria Aldeen", "Zaid Issam Ahmed Al-Jubouri", and "Abdullah Issam Ahmed Al-Jubouri". Same men, three spellings, and only one of the three carries any wallet at all.
That is the point. Alden and Abdulla Al-Jebouri can only be caught by name and counterparty screening, and name screening on Arabic transliterations is exactly where fuzzy matching either over-flags or misses. Zaid Al-Jebouri's seven TRON addresses do not have that problem: an address either matches or it does not. Screen against the SDN spellings with alias and fuzzy logic for the two wallet-less individuals, and confirm every identifier against the SDN entry directly rather than the press release.
Recognising the Full Network
Seven named wallets are the starting point, not the whole of it. On a TRON stablecoin operation of this kind, most of the value does not rest at the named addresses. It moves on to deposit addresses at exchanges, where it becomes spendable, and those deposit addresses are not on the SDN List. Screening only the seven published wallets stops at the edge of the network rather than at the point where it cashes out.
The Brotherhood-Hamas structure widens it further. This settlement layer connects upward to the charities and facilitators that raise and route the funds, and outward to whoever fed these addresses and whoever received from them. None of those counterparties are named in this action. The seven wallets are the visible surface of a network that is larger than the SDN entry shows.
The organised-crime side widens it again. Because the same operation serviced the Foxtrot Network and a further criminal group, on-chain flows that look like ordinary organised-crime activity may trace back to the operation now tied to Hamas. Exposure does not announce which client it came from, so a firm that cleared a Foxtrot-adjacent counterparty could be one hop from the same addresses that carry Hamas funds.
Compliance Obligations
All property and interests in property of the three designated individuals that are in the United States, or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. Entities owned 50 per cent or more, individually or in aggregate, by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.
Obligations include:
- Screening against the seven published TRON addresses across all counterparty exposure, including indirect exposure through intermediary hops and exchange deposit addresses
- Screening against all three individuals at the entity level, since two carry no wallet identifiers and can only be caught by name and counterparty screening
- Blocking any property or interests in property linked to the designated parties
- Reporting blocked holdings to OFAC
- Maintaining ongoing sanctions screening and transaction monitoring that updates as identifiers are added, rather than on a fixed refresh cycle
Unless authorised or exempt, OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons, or within or transiting the United States, involving blocked persons' property. Civil penalties may apply on a strict liability basis. Non-U.S. parties face secondary sanctions exposure: foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions for these parties risk losing access to the U.S. financial system.
Official Designation Document
OFAC Recent Actions, 23 July 2026: https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260723
Treasury press release: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0572
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